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Despite their current prevalence and historical significance, little is known about the economics of
open air markets. This paper uses open air markets as a natural laboratory to provide initial insights
into the underlying operation of such markets. Using data on thousands of individual transactions gathered
from May 2005- August 2008, I report several insights. First, the natural pricing and allocation mechanism
in open air markets is capable of approaching full efficiency, even in quite austere conditions. Yet,
a second result highlights the fragility of this finding: allowance of explicit seller communication frustrates
market efficiency in a broad array of situations. Making use of insights gained from a “mole” in the
marketplace, a third set of results revolves around economic questions pertaining to collusive arrangements
that are otherwise quite difficult to investigate. Overall, I find data patterns that are consistent with
certain theoretical predictions, as the evidence suggests that i) cheating rates increase as the coalition
is expanded, ii) sellers cheat less when they have collusive arrangements in several spatially differentiated
markets, and iii) sellers cheat more when they are experiencing periods of abnormally high profits.
These results follow from a combination of insights gained from building a bridge between the lab
and the naturally-occurring environment. By doing so, the study showcases that in developing a deeper
understanding of economic science, it is desirable to take advantage of the myriad settings in which








I.  Introduction 
 
  Bilateral bargaining has constituted the foundation of markets for centuries, from peasant 
economies—such as Athen’s Agora, Rome’s Forum, the medieval fairs and markets in England, 
and the 1,000 year old market in Morocco—to the substantial bazaars and “flea” markets that 
litter the landscape of developed and developing countries today.1  While it is difficult to provide 
an economic estimate of the importance of such markets, the National Flea Market Association 
reports that the number of flea markets in the US and the recorded gross sales have grown 
substantially in the past several years, with 2.25 million licensed vendors and more than $30 
billion in sales annually in 2005.  This is surely a vast underestimate, however, since a nontrivial 
portion of the transactions are carried out by non-licensed vendors and via non-taxed sales.2  
More broadly, such markets are commonly of great importance, especially in developing 
countries where the institution is crucial in the allocation of goods and services.3   
  Despite the importance of such markets in shaping economies of yesteryear and 
allocating goods and services today, little is known about the basic economic principles of such 
markets.  For example, whether the bread and butter of economics—supply and demand curve 
shape and location—provide accurate predictions of price and quantity realizations in such 
domains is relatively unknown.  Laboratory experimental results in Chamberlin (1948) suggest 
that such predictions perform rather poorly.  I take a different approach to this fundamental 
                                                           
1 The origin of the term “flea market” is difficult to trace.  Some argue that it is due to the market in Marche aux 
puces of Saint-Ouen, Seine-Saint-Denis, in the northern suburbs of Paris.  This particular market, which started in 
the 17
th century, is said to have earned the name “flea” from the flea-infested old furniture brought for sale as well as 
the clothing and rags sold at the market.   
2 Regionally, tax data from the state of Florida shows that flea markets account for roughly $170 million of revenue 
per month in Florida alone (http://www.state.fl.us/dor/tables/), and the San Jose CA Flea Market is known to attract 
nearly 60,000 customers per weekend.   
3 Examples are ubiquitous.  Consider Geertz (1978), who argues that up to 2/3 of the population of the Moroccan 
town that he studied (Sefrou, “a thriving market center of 15,000-30,0000 people” (Geertz, p. 28)) is employed at 
the local bazaar.   2
question by exploring behavior in open air markets in a major US metropolitan area, effectively 
reformulating the problem of stability of equilibria as a question about the behavior of agents in 
an actual marketplace.  My general line of attack is to undertake controlled experiments in these 
markets where factors at the heart of my conjecture are identifiable and arise endogenously.  I 
then impose the remaining experimental controls to learn something about underlying market 
behavior and equilibrating tendencies.   
A key result from the field experiments is the strong tendency for exchange prices to 
approach the prediction of competitive market equilibrium theory.  Even under the most severe 
tests of neoclassical theory (treatments that predict highly asymmetric rents) the expected price 
and quantity levels are approximated in many market periods.  These results suggest that in 
mature markets very few of the “typical” assumptions, such as Walrasian tâtonnement or 
centrally occurring open outcry of bids and offers, are necessary to approximate the predicted 
equilibrium in the field (see also List, 2004). 
Yet, such markets are ripe for price manipulation.  For instance, in certain cases small 
numbers of sellers provide homogeneous goods that are jointly purchased from middlemen, 
certain barriers to entry exist, and seller communication is continual.  Open communication 
channels surely remind the astute reader of the forewarning of Smith in the Wealth of Nations: 
"People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance 
to raise prices." 
 
Indeed, via interaction with an individual seller in this marketplace I learned interesting details of 
just such conspiracies in these markets.  Armed with knowledge from my “mole” and using 
insights gained from months of interaction in the market, I am able to build a bridge between the 
lab and the field, effectively exploring the behavior of experimental subjects across sterile and   3
rich settings.  This approach has a dual benefit in that it affords an opportunity to marry the vast 
experimental literature on collusion in laboratory experiments (see, e.g., Holt, 1995 for an 
excellent overview) with parallel behavior in the field.   
  I begin by collecting data in a controlled laboratory study with student subjects, and 
proceed to collect data using the exact same protocol with subjects from the open air market 
(denoted “market” subjects below) who have selected into various roles in the marketplace.  I 
then execute a series of controlled treatments that slowly moves the environment from a tightly 
controlled laboratory study to a natural field experiment (i.e., a setting where subjects do not 
know that they are part of an experiment—see Harrison and List (2004)).   
Several insights are obtained across both framed and natural field experiments.  First, the 
data patterns are generally consonant with economic theory.  For example, the evidence suggests 
that i) cheating rates are increasing in coalition size, resulting in total market surplus foregone 
due to collusive arrangements being significantly smaller as the collusive group grows, ii) sellers 
cheat less when they have multiple collusive arrangements in spatially differentiated markets; as 
a consequence, the total market surplus foregone increases as sellers become spatially integrated, 
and iii) sellers cheat more when they are experiencing periods of abnormally large profits, 
leading to total market surplus foregone being counter-cyclical.   
Second, I observe similar behavior across subject pools in tightly controlled settings.  
Yet, difficulties arise when mapping the effectiveness of collusive arrangements across domains.  
Whereas cooperation rates are found to be quite high in the tightly controlled experiments, I find 
that when sellers do not know that they are part of an experiment they cheat on the explicit 
agreements much more often.  The level of cheating observed in the natural field experiment is 
larger than cheating rates observed in any of the tightly controlled treatments.  Perhaps   4
surprisingly, however, in aggregate the best predictor of field cheating rates is behavior in sterile 
laboratory treatments with neutral language instructions.   
  I interpret these data as also providing more general lessons.  First, consistent with the 
theoretical work beginning with Stigler (1964), the field data suggest that maintaining strict 
compliance to the collusive agreement is difficult to sustain in a repeated game with secret price 
cuts and demand uncertainty.  In this manner, the data are consistent with the notion that inherent 
problems associated with maintaining collusive agreements might preclude conspiracies from 
having considerable influence on prices in related markets.  Second, inferential power is 
enhanced by building a bridge between the lab and the naturally-occurring environment and 
designing complementary experimental treatments to span this bridge.  This is made possible by 
combining experimental methods with an anthropological research approach (i.e., going to great 
lengths to familiarize oneself with the marketplace, the agents, social relationships, and the like).  
Third, even though the point estimates on cooperation rates are highly variable across lab and 
field environments, the conceptual relations among variables are similar, providing support for 
the notion that qualitative insights gained in one domain are transferable to others. 
II.  Market Background and Experimental Design 
Open Air Economies 
Bilateral bargaining represents one of the earliest forms of exchange.  As far back as 2 
million years ago, the appearance of manufactured stone tools in certain parts of the world 
provides suggestive evidence that our hominid ancestors practiced some form of primitive 
exchange, almost certainly organized by a simple bilateral mechanism.  Bilateral exchange 
continued to develop, extending in the period 30,000-40,000 years ago to portable art, personal 
ornamentation, and ever-more-intricate weapons and tools (Ofek, 2001).  Forms of ‘commodity   5
money’ developed during this period, further fueling the expansion of human trade; and 
combined with the development of agriculture around 10,000 years ago, laid the groundwork for 
human civilization (Diamond, 1992). 
Today, bilateral trading in a multi-lateral setting represents the backbone of markets 
worldwide.  From markets as distinct as the Barabazar in Shillong, India (the largest open air 
market in India) to the local flea markets in the US, buyers and sellers engage in an interaction 
that has each attempting to extract as much of the available rents as possible.  Explanations for 
why such markets play a more important role in some parts of the world than others naturally 
pertain to economic considerations.  First, due to information costs, such markets are attractive.  
For example, by centralizing the marketplace, buyers and sellers can interact more easily.   
Buyers absorb relatively low search costs, and sellers have low fixed costs and trivial 
expenditures on advertising.  Technological advance in developed countries has served to 
minimize these costs, perhaps leading such economies to rely less on such markets.  A second 
reason for the prevalence of such markets is that the opportunity to gain from price 
discrimination on individual sales might be quite high.  Yet, this advantage might not be 
important enough to overcome the prohibitive costs of bargaining in some parts of the world, 
such as in particular developed economies.   
Rich accounts exist concerning some specific bazaar economies and negotiation practices 
in such markets (see, e.g., Cassady, 1968; Geertz, 1978; Sherry, 1990).  Since such markets share 
features with the open air markets that I visited, I will provide only a brief summary of 
particulars that I have learned through my field research.  This is not meant to be an ethnographic 
description, but will have that flavor since these insights were gained from years of interactions. 
The Physical Market   6
Temporal assignment of the physical marketplace is typically done by a professional 
association or local seller who rents a large space, such as a coliseum, stadium, large parking 
area, or a fairground, and allocates tables to dealers for a nominal fee.  Rental rates vary from 
$20-$200 per slot and are filled on a first-come-first-served basis, yet most markets include the 
same sellers over time.   When the market opens, consumers mill around the marketplace, 
higgling and bargaining with sellers (dealers), who have their merchandise prominently 
displayed on their tables.  The principal market occurs between dealers and naïve consumers, but 
dealers do trade among themselves before, during, and after the market.  In some cases, 
consumers bring goods to the market and trade or sell them to dealers, or even might sell a good 
that they recently purchased in the market.  In other cases, consumers are interested in merely 
obtaining appraisals of their wares.  The duration of a typical “market” is a day or a weekend, 
and a lucrative market may provide any given dealer hundreds of exchange opportunities.   
Goods purchased and sold in the large metropolitan area markets that I frequented are 
highly varied, and include furniture, shoes, purses, tools, signs, books and magazines, perfumes, 
produce, meats, war memorabilia, antiques, sports collectibles, appliances, jewelry, hardware, 
tobacco products, clothing, coats, CDs, DVDs, ornaments, spices, oils, grains, artwork, and hand 
crafted products—from woodwork to knitted blankets to woven baskets.  Some of the goods are 
standardized along the quality and quantity dimensions, whilst others are not.  For example, 
some goods, such as tobacco products, CDs, DVDs, clothing, coats, purses, appliances, 
perfumes, furniture, and shoes, are branded, pre-packaged, or sealed to provide a level of 
standardization.  These goods are highly substitutable, whereas other goods—woven baskets, 
knitted blankets, and the like—are heterogeneous and many times do not have close substitutes.     7
For the non-standardized products, there is a level of suspicion that nothing is what it 
appears to be (i.e., trimmed, adulterated, short-weighted, etc.), but for standardized goods there is 
more confidence that the goods are as advertised.  Combining this fact with the realization that it 
is difficult to reward honesty and punish deceit, unscrupulousness becomes not a matter of one’s 
compromised ethical code, rather it is a precondition for continuation in the market, or the 
“rationality of the market” (Akerlof, 1970).  Under such conditions, either scrupulous sellers are 
driven out of the market or scruples are driven out of the sellers.  In this way, for the non-
standard goods, few consumers are deceived because they understand caveat emptor, whereas for 
standardized goods many seemingly buy unaware that the good is likely not as advertised.   
The Pricing and Allocation Mechanism 
Typically prices are not posted in this market, rather they are determined by haggle, 
where a buyer and seller take active roles in setting the final price.  Casual buyers typically 
engage in several rounds of negotiations before bargaining to sale on an item, but bargaining is 
much different across standardized and non-standardized goods.  For non-standardized goods, 
buyers focus their search intensively—honing in on one dealer and asking numerous questions 
about the good.  This situates the locus of competition on the buyer-seller pair.  Alternatively, for 
standardized goods, buyers typically search extensively by haggling with numerous dealers and 
focusing on the price dimension.  This approach moves the locus of competition between sellers.  
Through introspection, most readers likely will find this type of strategy familiar, as they 
commonly engage in this practice as well (i.e., consider your strategy the last time you purchased 
a new (standardized) or used (non-standardized) car). 
While the form and extent of bargaining varies widely across goods, there are some 
stylized facts in the marketplace.  First, sellers typically make a first offer, then the buyer makes   8
a bid, then the offers and bids roughly alternate.  Backward moves in offers and bids are usually 
shunned, and accepted bids are honored.  Yet, lying seems to be expected, as unreliable 
assertions in the give and take of bargaining seem to be the norm.  Second, usually bargaining is 
more drawn out for expensive goods and usually not protracted for low ticket items such as 
produce.  Third, both sellers and buyers employ tricks at the point of bargaining impasse:  sellers 
might offer another item at the same price, increase the quantity of the good, add a cheap “free” 
item, or the like.  Consumers typically “walk off,” perhaps to gather composure or to send a 
signal that s/he is a tough bargainer.  Sellers, of course, do not walk off, but an analogous action 
is to put a halt to negotiations by striking up a conversation with bystanders or a neighboring 
seller.  Fourth, for goods with a certain amount of haggle, there appears to be statistical 
discrimination:  the well-dressed seem to meet higher initial offers as do Caucasians; especially 
those who have kids by their side and are shopping for children’s goods.     
Geertz (1978, p. 29) provides an interesting description of the pricing and allocative 
efficiency of open air markets that he frequented:  “in the bazaar information is poor, scarce, 
maldistributed, inefficiently communicated, and intensely valued.”  As Geertz (1978) notes, this 
makes “clientelization” efficient since the imperfect information makes having a limited number 
of trading partners potentially more profitable than a series of impersonal market transactions.  
Under this view, long-term relationships are an efficient means to overcome the lack of 
information in such economies, especially for goods that are heterogeneous.   
In the markets that I frequented, social relationships between buyers and sellers do exist, 
but they are typically far removed from the institutionalized form of such partnerships that have 
formed elsewhere.  For example, I never noticed anything similar to the pratik in Haiti (Mintz, 
1967) or the suki in the Phillipines (Davis, 1973), where partners are described as linked by   9
credit arrangements and informal supply contracts that increase trust in the relationships.  Price 
dispersion in the markets that I frequented therefore tend to be a manifestation of ignorance, 
bargaining ability, consumer observables, and partnerships. 
Market Sundries 
Before proceeding to the experimental design, it is worthwhile to detail a few other 
market characteristics.  First, in this market sellers have continual interaction with one another.  
One might suspect that such interaction could lead to attempts to fix prices, especially in the 
standardized good case.  There are at least three important factors facing sellers attempting to 
collude in any market:  coordination, monitoring cheating, and entry.   
From months of interactions I learned that some of the standardized goods in the markets 
that I frequented were purchased from the black market, and that a subset of goods is purchased 
from a common middleman.  Thus, coordinating on a collusive price is much easier since sellers 
are aware of one another’s marginal costs.  Detecting cheating on agreements is also seemingly 
straightforward since sellers are in constant contact and consumers are constantly discussing 
exchange prices.  Yet, cheating is difficult to detect because i) buyers tend to shade their 
purchase prices when asked, and ii) even though sellers purchase from the same middleman, they 
oftentimes participate in some different markets so strict quantity monitoring is difficult.   
To gain insights on i), I ran a survey in the marketplace asking buyers how much they 
paid for the goods they just purchased.  More than 65% stated a value that I later determined to 
be too low (via either a monitor directly observing the price paid or an interview with the seller).  
It seems that buyers quote a lower transaction price because they fear being thought to be taken, 
or “played the fool.”  I learned of particulars concerning ii) from discussions with sellers and 
from survey responses.  Prohibiting entry is the final task of the colluders, but this seems to be   10
handled via a close watch on who is allowed to set up at the market.  Thus, upon taking care of 
the cheating incentive, it would seem that the conditions are ripe for attempts at price fixing in 
this market.  Coupling this, with the fact that there is certainly a “culture of collusion” present in 
these markets that perhaps rivals that of the rayon industry (see, e.g., Gallet and Shroeder, 1995), 
leads to an expectation that a degree of explicit collusive arrangements among sellers of some 
standardized goods exists in these markets.   
As detailed further below, discussions with a market “mole” led me to conclude that 27 
sellers across 8 different local flea markets were part of an explicit 2, 3, or 4 seller conspiracy.  
These sellers often had agreements on multiple goods, and agreements with multiple sellers.  I 
further learned from my “mole” that a strong majority of the collusive arrangements set prices by 
adding markup to costs.  In nearly all of the cases sellers simply applied a specific rule, such as 
“double the price,” or “mark-up by 100%” and remained with this price for long periods of time.   
Experimental Design 
Prior to discussing the details of the experimental design, I outline a roadmap of the 
treatments executed.  This might serve as a useful source to not only the impatient reader, but 
also provide a “forest-like” reminder to those readers who might get engrossed in the specific 
details of the “trees” below.   
Table 1 provides an outline of the various treatments, making use of the terminology of 
Harrison and List (2004).  The laboratory treatments are in the spirit of the extant literature (see, 
e.g., Isaac and Plott, 1981; Isaac et al., 1984; Davis and Holt, 1998; Cason and Mason, 1999; 
Feinberg and Snyder, 2002; Davis and Wilson, 2002).  Within these treatments, I vary the i) 
subject pool—from students to actual market participants at open air markets, ii) anonymity 
conditions (none to perfect anonymity between subjects), and iii) context of the game.  In terms   11
of the context used in the experimental instructions, I begin with instructions that use neutral 
language and proceed to instructions that include wording such as “collusive pricing,” “collusive 
partner,” etc.  As Table 1 highlights, these treatments are meant to span the range of “traditional” 
laboratory and artefactual field experiments.   
Moving one step closer to the market environment of ultimate interest, I depart from 
these abstract games and experiment with an institution in which the participants are naturally 
engaged in this market—bilateral negotiation markets—in a set of framed field treatments.  A 
few features of this particular market make it attractive to examine predictions of competitive 
theory in multi-lateral decentralized markets.  First, I am observing behavior of agents who have 
endogenously chosen certain roles within the marketplace—such as being a buyer (nondealer) or 
seller (dealer).  Second, the task and the stakes in the experimental treatments are quite similar to 
the naturally occurring market.  In this sense, I am gathering data in a natural environment while 
still maintaining the necessary control to execute a clean test of theory.   
This set of treatments, which is summarized in column 2 of Table 1, includes variants 
that preclude communication among sellers as well as several treatments that permit 
communication.  This approach is used for two primary reasons: i) no communication treatments 
serve to provide a baseline of comparison for the communication treatments and ii) testing 
whether competitive theory adequately organizes data in multi-lateral decentralized market 
institutions is interesting in its own right.   
The ultimate treatments—denoted natural field experiment in column 3 of Table 1—have 
my confederates approach sellers who do not know that they are taking part in an experiment.  In 
these treatments I use identical demand structures to those used in the framed field treatments.  
Much can be learned from these treatments because of the knowledge I have of certain explicit   12
agreements (overtly collusive agreements) in this marketplace from a mole who provided enough 
detailed information to execute a controlled test in the market.  I now turn to a more patient 
description of the experimental design, which was carried out from May 2005-August 2008.   
A.  Lab Experiment Particulars 
My overarching goal in designing the laboratory experiments is to maintain congruence 
with the extant experimental literature and provide a first step in creating a bridge between the 
lab and field.  With these dual goals in mind, I use a design similar to Holcomb and Nelson 
(1997) and Feinberg and Snyder (2002).  Experimental instructions are in Appendix A.   
The employed game is simple and calls for two players in a market to choose 
simultaneously one of three prices: P1, P2, and P3, where these prices represent the “collusive” 
price, an “undercutting” price, and a “punishment” price (although in the instructions price 
choices are labeled P1, P2, and P3).  The resulting payoffs from each of the 9 cells are given in 
Table 1A in Appendix A.4  Subjects were informed that their partner was determined randomly 
and that they would remain partners throughout the experiment.  Further, the experiment was to 
be run for 10 periods after which a randomization scheme would determine if the experiment 
concluded:  a six-sided die was tossed and if a 1 or 2 was thrown the game ended, otherwise 
another round was played.  After this round, again a die was thrown and the game ended with a 
1/3 probability.  Thus, the game had a continuation beyond 10 periods with a 2/3 probability and 
                                                           
4 Some readers might find the spirit of these treatments similar to the Green and Porter (1984) model.  In that case, 
the stage game has two firms simultaneously choosing prices for a homogeneous product.  They split demand 
equally for identical price choices, but the low price firm obtains all of the demand if the prices are unequal.  With 
constant marginal cost and market demand fluctuations that are observable, the collusive price is sustainable for a 
discount rate less than or equal to 100% (a discount factor of ½ or greater).  For more impatient sellers, the unique 
equilibrium involves marginal cost pricing.  For the case of secret price cuts, or demand shocks that are 
unobservable, the minimum discount factor that sustains collusion is higher.   
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each round thereafter followed a similar continuation rule.5  In many cases, experimenters use an 
infinite horizon game such as this one to permit collusive agreements to be an equilibrium; under 
the parameters of this game, however, cooperation is an equilibrium.6   
I conducted one experimental session with undergraduate student participants from a 
major university for each of four treatments.  Twenty-four students participated in each session.  
Subjects participated in one treatment; therefore inference is made using purely between-subject 
variation.  In Treatment LabIS (denoting lab treatment I with student subjects), after each period 
subjects are informed only of their payoffs.  Given that they are aware of their own choice and 
the payoff matrix, they can easily deduce the other’s choice since there is no stochastic element 
of demand in Treatment LabIS.  This is similar to Feinberg and Snyder (2002).   
Treatment Lab IIS (denoting lab treatment II with students) is identical to Treatment 
LabIS except there are demand shocks.  Subjects are again informed about their own payoffs 
after each period but not about rival’s actions.  In this case, however, a negative demand shock 
yields a zero payoff to each player regardless of their choice.  Participants were instructed at the 
outset of the experiment that shocks would occur in roughly 10% of the periods (and the shock 
was carried out in period 5).  Thus, given that subjects were unaware of whether their payoffs 
were due to demand shocks or their rival’s price cut, they cannot deduce whether or not their 
                                                           
5 As Rasmusen (1989, p. 103) notes, “the reason why games with a constant probability of ending are like infinite 
games is nicely pointed out by a verse from Amazing Grace:   
  When we’ve been there ten thousand years, 
  Bright shining as the sun, 
  We’ve no less days to sing God’s praise 
  Than when we’d first begun.” 
6 To see this, note that in a 5-period game with the payoff structure imposed a strategy of “play collusion for rounds 
1-4, then play undercutting for round 5 if no prior defections; if prior defection play punishment for the remainder of 
the game,” has the mutual best response property and therefore represents an equilibrium to the finite game.   
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rival had deviated.  Readers familiar with Stigler (1964) will find similarities of this treatment to 
his modeling of an oligopolist facing uncertain demand.   
The third student treatment, Treatment Lab IIIS (denoting lab treatment III with 
students), is identical to Treatment LabIIS except students are introduced to their partner directly 
before the game begins:  before the first practice round begins, the monitor asks the pairs to stand 
up one by one, look at each other, and make a brief introduction by stating their name and year in 
school.  Subsequent to all pairs completing their introduction, play began.   
The final laboratory treatment, denoted Treatment LabIIISC, is identical to Treatment 
Lab IIIS but uses instructions with context.  For instance, rather than labeling the price choices as 
P1, P2, and P3, I denote them as the “collusive,” “undercutting,” and “punishment” prices.  In 
addition, the framework is now denoted a “market,” sellers are determining their choices within a 
duopolistic setting, and they are receiving “profits” rather than “payoffs” (see Appendix A).   
Complementing these laboratory explorations with student subjects are identical 
treatments carried out with actual sellers from various open air markets.  These treatments are 
labeled LabIM, LabIIM, LabIIIM, and LabIIIMC (denoting lab treatments with market subjects, 
or artefactual field treatments in Table 1), and are carried out in a large US metropolitan area.  In 
this particular area more than 20 flea markets operate on any given weekend.   
Each flea market participant’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) consideration 
of the invitation to participate in an experiment, (2) learning the market rules, (3) actual market 
participation (in their actual sales booth), and (4) conclusion of the experiment.  In Step 1, before 
the market opened, a monitor approached sellers in a randomly determined order and inquired 
about their interest in participating in an experiment that would last approximately 30 minutes   15
during the weekend.  Once the prerequisite number of sellers agreed to participate (i.e., a seller 
had a partner), monitors thoroughly explained the experimental rules in Step 2.   
The experimental instructions for these treatments are identical to Appendix A.  Similar 
to the student treatments, there was no participation fee paid.  Different from the student 
treatments is that the marketers completed the experiment period-by-period during the trading 
day while physically located in their actual sales booth.  Thus, after each subject made a 
decision, both were provided with payoff information for that period.  Similar to the student 
treatments, in the anonymity treatments sellers were never made aware of their partners and they 
were informed this would be the case.  In Step 3, sellers participated in the experiment.  In Step 
4, they were paid their earnings in private after they filled out the survey in Appendix B.   
For the parameters employed, a strategy of only one period of reversion is required to 
sustain collusion (i.e., a tit-for-tat strategy) for both the treatments that have known opponent 
choices (Lab IS and Lab IM) as well as the treatments that have unobserved opponent choices 
(Lab IIS, Lab IIIS, Lab IIISC, Lab IIM, Lab IIIM, and Lab IIIMC).  This equilibrium holds 
whether the trigger strategies employed utilize the undercutting or the punishment choice.   
Column 1 in Table 1 provides a summary of the various laboratory treatments and 
provides relevant sample sizes.  In total, I observe the behavior of 96 students across 4 treatments 
and 96 marketers across 4 treatments.  Given that each student (marketer) subject made at least 
10 choices, I gathered more than 1900 observations in these treatments.   
B.  Framed Field Experiment Particulars 
To move one step closer to the actual market setting in which these agents naturally 
engage, I design a series of field treatments that allow observation of face-to-face continuous 
bilateral bargaining in a multi-lateral market.  Such a constructed market shares similarities with   16
the bazaar economies scattered around the world today.  These treatments vary basic aspects of 
the market structure: demand and supply shapes, the number of sellers, and the ability to 
communicate.  A first objective of this exercise is to examine under what conditions do prices 
and quantities converge to the intersection of supply and demand.  To do so, these treatments 
suppress important aspects of the common marketplace—information asymmetry among buyers 
about market possibilities, socio-cultural factors, etc.—to focus on whether the institution in its 
simplest form can yield efficient outcomes.   
Much like Smith’s (1962) set-up, the market mechanics in these bilateral bargaining 
markets are not Walrasian.  Unlike Smith (1962), however, in these markets subjects set prices as 
they please, with no guidance from a centralized auctioneer.  Thus, this design shifts the task of 
adaptation from the auctioneer to the agents, permitting trades to occur in a decentralized 
manner, similar to how trades are consummated in actual free unobstructed markets.  In doing so, 
the market structure reformulates the problem of stability of equilibria as a question about the 
behavior of people as a question within the realms of psychology, as opposed to a question about 
an abstract auctioneer steering the market adjustment process.   
The basic market design is similar in spirit to Chamberlin (1948), as extended by List 
(2004).7  Each participant’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) consideration of the 
invitation to participate in an experiment, (2) learning the market rules, (3) actual market 
participation, and (4) conclusion of the experiment and exit interview.  In Step 1, before the 
market opened, a monitor randomly approached sellers in the market (in a large US metropolitan 
area) and inquired about their interest in participating in an experiment that would take about 45 
minutes.  Since most sellers are accompanied by at least one helper, it was not difficult to obtain 
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agreements after it was explained that money could be earned during the experiment.  To gather 
the buyer subject pool, a monitor randomly approached buyers in the market and inquired about 
their level of interest in participating in an experiment that would last about 45 minutes. 
  Once the prerequisite number of sellers and buyers agreed to participate, monitors 
thoroughly explained the experimental rules in Step 2.  The experimental instructions for the 
various treatments are standard in the market experimental literature (see Davis and Holt (1993; 
pp. 47-55)).  A few aspects of the experimental design should be highlighted.  First, to ensure 
transactions at reservation values, a $0.50 commission for each executed trade was provided for 
both buyers and sellers. 
  Second, buyers (dealers) were informed that the experiment consisted of at least 5 rounds 
and that they would be consumers (sellers) in the experiment.  In each round, each buyer would 
be given a “buyer’s card,” which contained a number, known only by that buyer, representing the 
maximum price that he or she would be willing to pay for one unit.  Dealers were informed that 
they would be sellers in the experimental market. In each round, each seller would be given a 
“seller’s card,” which contained numbers, known only to that seller, representing the minimum 
for which he or she would be willing to sell their units.  Importantly, all agents were informed 
that this information was strictly private and that reservation values would change each round.  
They were also informed about the number of buyers and sellers in the market and that agents 
may have different reservation values.  Further, similar to the laboratory treatments, a 
randomization scheme determined if the experiment concluded after round 5:  a six-sided die was 
tossed and if a 1-5 was thrown the game ended, otherwise another round was played.  After this 
round, again a die was thrown and the game ended with a 5/6 probability.     18
  Third, the monitor explained how earnings (in excess of the commission fees) were 
determined: for sellers, the difference between the actual contract price and the minimum 
reservation value determined producer rents. Likewise, buyers’ earnings were determined by the 
difference between the contract price and the reservation value.  Several examples illustrated the 
irrationality associated with selling (buying) the commodity below (above) induced values. 
  Fourth, the commodities used in the framed field treatment were various goods (e.g., CDs 
and DVDs), which were useless (cracked, split, or in pieces taped together), making them 
valueless outside of the experimental market.  Thus, the assignment given to sellers was clear, 
and an everyday occurrence: sell the good for as much as possible.  Likewise, the task 
confronting buyers was also clear:  enter the marketplace and purchase the good for as little as 
possible.  The goods and participating sellers were clearly marked to ensure that buyers had no 
trouble finding the commodity of interest.  Fifth, buyers and sellers engaged in several short 
practice periods to gain experience. 
  In Step 3, subjects participated in the market.  Each market session consisted of at least 5 
market periods that lasted 5 minutes each.  After each period, a monitor privately gathered with 
buyers and gave them a new buyer’s card, while a different monitor privately gave sellers a new 
seller’s card.  Throughout the no communication sessions, careful attention was given to prohibit 
discussions between sellers (and buyers) that could induce collusive outcomes.  In the 
communication treatments, seller communication was permitted (unbeknownst to buyers).  I 
followed Davis and Holt (1998) in the information allowance.  For example, subjects were not 
allowed to discuss nonpublic information such as unit costs, post-session side payments, or 
threats of a physical nature.  Step 4 concluded the experiment – after subjects completed a 
survey, they were paid their earnings in private (Appendix B contains the survey).   19
  This procedure was followed in each of the treatments summarized in the middle column 
of Table 1.  The first treatment, denoted FramedNCsymm (framed field experiment with no 
communication, symmetric demand and supply), contains 12 buyers with unit-demand and 4 
sellers, who each have 3 units to supply.8  No communication is allowed among sellers or among 
buyers, but importantly, after each transaction is recorded, everyone in the market is made aware 
of the price.  This is done via a board and an announcement to the experimental subjects.   
Table 2 and Figure 1 present buyer and seller induced values.  In Figure 1, each step 
represents a distinct induced value that was given to buyers (demand curve) and sellers (supply 
curve).  The efficient outcome yields $37 in rents per round, with an associated equilibrium price 
between $13.00-$14.00 and a quantity of 7.  This represents the extreme point of intersection of 
buyer and supplier rent areas in Figure 1.  Under competitive assumptions, producer surplus 
ranges from $15-22, with the remaining rents ($15-$22) accruing to buyers.   
Treatment FramedNCasymm (denoting framed field experiment with no communication, 
asymmetric supply) is identical to FramedNCasymm  except for one deviation:  supply is 
perfectly elastic at $2, $7, and $13.50, depending on treatment.  Thus, in one treatment the 4 
sellers have a constant marginal cost of $2 for each of their 3 units, in another $7, and in a third 
$13.50.  In these treatments, the efficient perfectly competitive outcome yields $144, $84, and 
$18.50 in rents per period for the $2, $7 and $13.50 treatment, which occurs where competitive 
price theory predicts the static price/quantity equilibrium of Price = $2-$9 ($2 treatment), $7-$9 
($7 treatment), and $13.50, and Quantity = 12, 12, and 7 to be reached.  The $13.50 sessions 
                                                           
8 Consistent with the previous literature, these treatments are production-to-demand: sellers only pay the cost of 
producing the good upon sale.  An interesting exploration is to determine whether similar properties hold in two-
stage cases:  the seller pays to produce the product and then takes it to the market, with an excess supply being 
valueless.  Pilot treatments along these lines show much more volatility in prices, but similar equilibrating 
properties.  I reserve this discussion for another occasion.     20
represent a stringent test of neoclassical theory, as in equilibrium the entire rents are allocated to 
buyers due to the five excess units.  
  Treatment FramedCasymm (denoting framed field experiment where seller 
communication is allowed, asymmetric supply) is identical to Treatment FramedNCasymm, but 
now communication is allowed between sellers.  For instance, explicit seller communication 
between rounds to induce attempts to fix prices is permitted, unbeknownst to buyers.   
Importantly, a monitor records for each period whether there is an agreed upon collusive price 
and therefore “cheating” on the agreement can be observed (by the monitors).  Within this 
treatment are again several variants.  For example, I include three constant marginal cost levels: 
$2, $7, and $13.50.  Under these treatments, the efficient joint profit-maximizing strategy for 
sellers yields a price of $11 or $12 in the $2 treatment, $14 in the $7 treatment, and $17 in the 
$13.50 treatment.  This provides seller rents of $90, $49, and $10.50 in every period.9   
To move closer to the actual marketplace in increments, I build on the FramedCasymm 
$7 treatment, as follows (each builds on the preceding treatment with noted deviations):   
1.  Treatment Framedinf: I provide sellers with an infinite supply at a $7 marginal cost. 
2.  Treatment Framednoprice: I do not announce price realizations after a transaction.   
3.  Treatment FramedShock: players are told that I have randomly pre-selected ~20% of the 
periods in which demand will be such that payoffs will be zero (i.e., no sales will be possible), 
and that no one will be told either before or after which period was the demand shock period.  In 
practice, each of the buyers received an induced value of $6 in period 3 in this treatment.   
                                                           
9 Of course, monopoly prices and rents are based upon the setting of a single monopoly price. In this case, this is 
akin to sellers agreeing upon a single take-it-or-leave-it price. Such a strategy does not permit sellers to engage in 
price discriminating behavior and may not necessarily reflect the optimal selling mechanism.   21
4.  Treatment Framedtable: rather than conduct the experiment in 5-minute periods, I place 
the good on the seller’s table and inform them that occasionally a potential buyer will be 
stopping by to purchase the good.  I attempt to space the visits in a fashion similar to visitation 
rates of the parallel goods in this market.  The experiment lasts the entire day/weekend of the 
market and rather than having a structured period-by-period event, I have each buyer enter the 
market with induced values taken from the demand curve used in the above treatments.   
For example, buyer 1 is given induced values 19, 14, 16, 13, and 14 for the first 5 
“periods” to approach seller group 1 and is given 18, 9, 10, 17, and 11 for the last 5 “periods” to 
approach seller group 2 (see Table 2, buyer 1 and 2 values).10  This approach is used to ensure 
that the exact same induced values are utilized across treatments.  And, buyers are informed that 
they have five minutes to execute a transaction with any of the four sellers with that induced 
value.  After the five minutes, or directly after the buyer executes a transaction, the buyer 
receives a new induced value and returns to the market.  Similar to the treatments discussed 
above, sellers are free to discuss pricing in the presence of monitors, but are prohibited from 
discussing nonpublic information such as unit costs, post-session side payments, or threats of a 
physical nature.  This treatment is meant to move from a “hot” environment to a “cooler” 
environment that might more closely represent actual market conditions.11   
                                                           
10 Buyer 2 is given induced values 19, 14, 16, 13, and 14 for the first 5 “periods” to approach seller group 2 and is 
given 18, 9, 10, 17, and 11 for the last 5 “periods” to approach seller group 1 (with induced values 12 and 16 
inserted randomly to complete the demand function).  To mimic the lab experiments, I have buyers approach the 
seller groups uniformly.  Thus, buyers 1-12 approach seller groups 1 and 2; buyers 13-24 approach seller groups 3 
and 4.  In this way, each seller group is approached by the entire demand in one session of the lab experiments (i.e., 
is approached with each of the induced values in Table 2) and each buyer approaches the “4 seller market” 5 times, 
consistent with the lab experiments (though in this case buyers approach 2 “4 seller markets” rather than one).  In 
aggregate, therefore, each 4 seller market is approached 60 times (12 buyers frequenting the market 5 times each).   
11 One result from the psychology literature is that there are important behavioral differences between short run 
(hot) and long (cold) run decision making.  In the hot phase, visceral factors and emotions might prove quite 
important, whereas in the cold phase immediate reactions are more carefully suppressed.  In this sense, the hot/cold 
settings can lead to much different behaviors (see, e.g., Gneezy and List (2006)).     22
5.  Treatment Framedtable2: 2 sellers rather than 4 sellers are included in each session.  In 
some of the pairs sellers face the exact same demand curve in FramedTable; in others sellers face 
the same effective individual seller demand as FramedTable (i.e., every other step is taken out of 
the demand curve in Figure 1).12  Additionally, partnership arrangements are varied randomly:  
in some cases I have two sellers who are part of an explicit agreement outside the experiment as 
partners, in other variants I make two sellers partners who are not part of an explicit agreement 
outside the experiment (I expand on how I know this information below).   
6.  Treatment FramedHighstakes: I multiply all seller earnings by 5.  Thus, if a seller 
earns $40, then I make it $200 in this treatment. 
Column 2 in Table 1 provides a summary of the various treatments and provides sample 
sizes.  In total, I observe the behavior of more than 300 unique buyers and 116 unique sellers in 
these treatments.  Since buyers and sellers are observed several times, I again have thousands of 
observations—both completed and uncompleted transactions—in this set of treatments.   
C.  Natural Field Experiment Particulars 
The goal of the natural field experimental treatments is to maintain the integrity of the 
framed field treatments discussed above, while exploring aspects associated with the naturally-
occurring collusive arrangements.  In these treatments subjects do not know that they are taking 
part in an experiment.  This exploration is made possible by the information that my mole 
conveyed through a series of discussions.   
More specifically, in the natural field treatment (hereafter denoted Field), which includes 
data gathered from the same flea markets (as described above) in the greater metropolitan area in 
                                                           
12 The arrangement of buyers and sellers is otherwise identical as Treatment FramedTable:  buyers approach the 
market 10 times and seller groups are approached uniformly (of course, in the cases where demand is cut in half, 
those seller groups are approached 30 times rather than 60).     23
early 2006-2007, I consulted with my mole to determine which sellers had collusive 
arrangements with one another and with my mole.  A typical agreement in this marketplace was 
a constant percentage mark-up rule.  For example, since in the majority of cases the sellers 
purchased goods jointly from the same supplier, they were fully aware of one another’s marginal 
cost for the item.  They then applied a specific rule, such as “double the price,” or “mark-up by 
100%.”  From discussions with my mole, I earmarked 27 sellers across 8 different local flea 
markets that were part of an explicit 2, 3, or 4 seller conspiracy (in some cases with my mole).  
Note that these sellers often had agreements on multiple goods, and agreements with multiple 
sellers; thus I can examine robustness across classes of goods and number of conspirators in an 
agreement.  Also, note that these same sellers are included as subjects in some of the experiments 
above.  I attempted to space the experiments—in some cases across several months—in a 
manner that would preclude cross-contamination.   
The recruitment of buying agents typically followed four steps: (1) consideration by the 
buyer to participate in an experiment, (2) learning the market rules, (3) actual market 
participation, and (4) conclusion of the experiment and exit interview.  In Step 1, potential 
buying subjects approached the monitor’s dealer table and inquired about various goods—CDs, 
DVDs, etc.—displayed on the table.  The monitor then asked if the agent was interested in 
participating in an experiment that would last about 15-25 minutes.  If the agent agreed to 
participate, a monitor thoroughly explained the experimental rules.  
The monitor began by explaining how earnings were determined:  the difference between 
the price paid for the commodity and the maximum reservation price determined market 
earnings.  Similar to the treatments above, I use the induced buyer values from Figure 1 (with the   24
necessary adjustments made to values when the marginal cost was less or greater than $7).13  The 
commodities that were used in the experiment were similar to the goods that were on the 
monitor’s table (in which the consumer initially expressed an interest in purchasing).14   
A few noteworthy design issues should be mentioned before proceeding to the results 
discussion.  First, each dealer was approached several times during the natural field treatment.  
The spacing of visits was such to attenuate any suspicion—one example is that dealer i was 
approached by agent n on Saturday afternoon for good j and by agent m on Sunday morning for 
the same good.  The seller was then approached on several other days in a similar fashion as 
well.  And, the ordering of the visits was random.  I observed no ordering effect, so I suppress 
further discussion of this issue.    
Second, unlike audit studies that test for market discrimination (see Riach and Rich, 
2003), I am directing the agent to buy the good.  In this sense, these are not transactors who 
obliquely discontinue bargaining if the seller accepts an offer; on the contrary, these are actual 
transactions wherein I am obtaining actual sales prices.  Since transactions are typically in cash 
at flea markets, I provided the necessary funds to purchase the goods when the buyer was short 
of funds.  Third, note that great care was taken to ensure that the data were gathered from 
interactions that would naturally occur in the marketplace.  Subjects initially entered the market 
to buy goods that were very similar to the good that I had them buying.  Fourth, I induce a 
similar demand structure as to what I induced in the various framed field treatments.  
                                                           
13 For instance, in the cases where the known seller marginal cost was $5, I shifted the demand function down $2; 
thus in this case the intercept was $17 and the lowest induced value was $7.  Also, similar to the framed treatments 
subjects were informed that if they purchased the good above their reservation value that the difference would be 
taken out of their profits.  No subject purchased the good at a price above their reservation value.   
14 The subject having an interest in the good provides realism in that dealers naturally face this subject type in the 
marketplace, but it comes at a potential cost—dubious consumers may use the bargaining session to arrange for later 
purchase of the good from the dealer.  To avoid this potential issue, I ensured the subject that if s/he would like to 
purchase the good after the experiment I would sell at the same price at which s/he purchased the good.   25
Finally, similar to the framed field treatments, each confederate had a 5-minute time limit 
imposed; in every case but a few, interactions were completed well before the 5 minutes were 
consumed.  It should be noted that throughout the experiment the sellers were not aware that an 
experiment was occurring.  This ensured that the process was as natural as possible for sellers.  I 
should stress that my confederate buyers did not know that this was a study on collusion; rather 
they were informed to purchase the good for me, and that this was to be kept completely private.  
They were further informed that all earnings would be forfeited if I found they conveyed any 
information to sellers.  Step 4 concluded the experiment—after subjects completed a confidential 
survey, they were paid their earnings in private.   
In total, I observed 455 individual negotiations.  These negotiations are observed from 
the behavior of 27 sellers who were each visited by several of my 82 buying confederates.  Each 
buying confederate approached anywhere from 2-10 sellers, with the average slightly greater 
than five.  And, similar to the treatments above, the confederates only purchased 1 unit per seller 
per visit, and bundling of items was not allowed (i.e., buyers did not purchase another good to 
bundle with the good of interest).   
III.  Experimental Results 
Similar to Section II, I discuss the empirical results in three separate sub-sections.  I 
begin with a summary of the lab and artefactual field treatments, proceed to the framed field 
treatments, and conclude with a discussion of data from the natural field experiment.    
A.  Lab Experimental Results 
Table 3 provides a snap shot of the results across the student and market subject pools.  
The table provides the raw proportions of choices for each of the three price categories across   26
subject pool and treatment type.  Table 3 also includes average profits per period and a measure 
of efficiency (measured as total group profits divided by total profits available ($2)).   
A first interesting data pattern is that there is a fair amount of cooperative behavior in 
these treatments.  The percentage of collusive choices ranges as high as 61.4% in treatment 
LabIIIMC, and even in cases with unobserved demand shocks and complete anonymity between 
sellers the collusive strategy is chosen in more than 45% of the cases.  General data patterns are 
consistent with previous efforts in this literature, in that the degree of collusive play is quite high.   
In the statistical tests, I begin with a conservative approach by first calculating the pair-
wise mean collusive choices across the periods and then exploring patterns of these means.   
Thus, rather than each individual providing 10 data points, under this approach each collusive 
pair provides one observation.  Several insights are obtained.  First, using a test of proportions, I 
find that the proportion of collusive play in each treatment is significantly greater than zero.  
Further, I cannot reject that at least half of the observed choices are collusive.  Such data might 
be interpreted as supporting aggressive antitrust policy since the often embraced comforting 
notion that cartels are fragile coalitions cannot be broadly asserted from these data.   
Second, results from a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of treatment differences suggests 
that i) collusive rates are higher in treatment Lab IS than treatment Lab IIS, and ii) Lab IIIS 
collusive rates are higher than Lab IIS rates at conventional significance levels.  The first 
comparative static result highlights the increased difficulty associated with colluding when 
demand shocks are unobservable.  Examining a level deeper, the data are consistent with subjects 
using trigger strategies, in that in many cases “price wars” occurred after one player chose to 
undercut prices or after the 5
th period demand shock.  Players reacted similarly to these events 
and this lead to less collusive play in the demand shock treatments.  Yet, I do observe a stronger   27
tendency for some players in treatments Lab IIS and Lab IIIS to undercut price even before 
period 5, perhaps believing that they can hide behind the veil of the secret demand shock.   
The second result provides an indication of the importance of anonymity between 
subjects.15  This result fits in nicely with a broader literature on how dimensions of anonymity 
affect behavior.  For example, List et al. (2004) found that the degree of anonymity between 
subjects influenced their propensity to contribute to a public good in a one-shot decision:   
subjects cooperated to a greater extent when they know the identity of their partner, and vice 
versa (see Levitt and List, 2007, for further discussion).  Alternatively, an anonymity effect is not 
found in the marketer’s data set, in aggregate.  Yet, if one considers the data more carefully, a 
pattern consistent with the importance of anonymity prevails.  Using the insights gained from the 
survey in Appendix B, I examine whether the subset of marketers who have had previous 
interaction is influenced by the anonymity condition.  I find that those partners in Lab IIIM who 
have had previous interaction not only collude more often than other groups in Lab IIIM, but 
also collude more often than subjects in Lab IIM.16   
Further, I find that collusive rates in LabIIIMC are greater than collusive rates in 
LabIIIM, suggesting that context matters a great deal in the marketer experiment.  Interestingly, 
the context serves to heighten cooperation rates to levels that exceed even the most cooperative 
treatments in the student sample.  During the post-session survey, I informally discussed the 
experiment with subjects in the LabIM, LabIIM, and Lab IIIM treatments and a majority of 
players did not place a collusive context on the game when asked about its nature. 
                                                           
15 Anonymity can usefully be broken down to three configurations:  relative to other experimental subjects, relative 
to the experimenter, and anonymity that rules out pecuniary gains through reputation formation.  I consider only 
comparative static changes in the first.   
16 Since I do not know which partners in Lab IIM have had previous interaction, I cannot determine whether this 
result is due to treatment or selection.    28
To complement the above analysis, I estimate empirically an equation of individual 
decisions that explicitly controls for the panel nature of the data.  Specifically I estimate Cit = 
β`Xi + eit, eit ~N[0,1], where Cit equals unity if agent i made a collusive choice in period t, and 
equals zero otherwise; Xi includes the treatment effect dichotomous variables and the 
observables from the survey.17  Empirical results are broadly consistent with the findings 
discussed above so I make these results available upon request.   
B.  Framed Field Experimental Results 
Table 4 provides summary results for the series of framed field treatments.  Entries in 
Table 4 are at the period level and include average price and its standard deviation and quantity 
traded.  Table 4 can be read as follows: in period 1 of the NCSymm treatment, on average in the 
two sessions, five goods were purchased at a trading price of $14.00 (std. dev.=1.71).  
  Results from the symmetrical demand and supply structure provide evidence that the 
intersection of supply and demand does an adequate job of predicting data trajectories.  For example, 
4 out of 5 market periods had average trading prices within the predicted $13-$14 competitive 
range—and several executed trades (41 of 62) were within the competitive market range over the 
five periods.  In addition, the ultimate two periods had the theoretically correct quantity level of units 
traded.  Finally, efficiency levels were quite high, reaching 95% in the latter two periods.18   
Data from the NCAsymm sessions also provide some evidence of convergence.  For 
example, as average price in period 1 of the $13.50 treatment is $15.12, by period 5 the average 
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=Π = Π − ∫ , where gij = 2Cij – 1; and qij = β`Xij + 
[corr (eij, eis)/ (1- corr (eij, eis))]
1/2ei.   
 
18 I define efficiency as the portion of total surplus ($37 in the symmetric case) captured.  Thus, a 95% rate of 
efficiency represents profits of roughly $35 in that period.     29
price decreases to $13.59, and the allocation of rents is almost entirely tilted toward buyers.  This 
tendency toward neoclassical expectations yields 11 of 14 last period trades at the equilibrium 
price of $13.50.  Data from the $2 and $7 treatments also show similar signs of convergence, 
though the $7 data is not as strong, and by the fifth period is only bordering on neoclassical 
expectations.  This is likely a result that in equilibrium there are no excess sellers.  Nevertheless, 
quantity predictions are met in each of the treatments. 
As a whole, these data indicate that centralized authority of prices, either via the 
Walrasian tâtonnement or double-auction mechanism, is not a necessary condition for market 
outcomes to approach the basic predictions of supply and demand intersection.  This result is at 
odds with Chamberlin’s (1948) seminal results, which suggest that such institutions yield prices 
that are too low and quantities that are too high.  I believe that having incentivized agents who 
are experienced in their roles and tasks, and who are able to gain experience with the rules and 
dictates of the market are likely reasons for the disparate results.  Importantly, these results show 
that if left unfettered this institution has the ability to allocate goods and services efficiently. 
Economists generally agree that explicit communication amongst sellers will lead to 
attempts at price fixing, yet little consensus exists as to the ultimate impact of such attempts on 
market prices (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006).  Treatments CAsymm$2, CAsymm$7, and 
CAsymm$13.50 provide some insight in this regard.  In the field, if the costs associated with 
maintaining collusive arrangements are prohibitive, then such agreements will be rendered 
ineffective.  These treatments likely give collusive arrangements a good chance to succeed by i) 
providing a simple platform for enacting collusive arrangements, ii) immediate price posting, iii) 
not allowing entry, and iv) permitting communication after each period.     30
The data summary in Table 4 provides evidence that opening up communication channels 
among sellers considerably influences pricing outcomes.  While the pricing policies are in many 
periods different from the efficient joint profit-maximizing strategy for sellers (price of $11 or 
$12 in the $2 treatment, $14 in the $7 treatment, and $17 in the $13.50 treatment), there is a 
tendency toward these price levels.  Further, there is a tendency for prices to be above the 
competitive predictions in these settings ($2-$9 for the $2 treatment; $7-$9 for the $7 treatment; 
and $13.50 for the $13.50 treatment).  Overall, the data point to the fact that communication 
between sellers can inhibit efficiency and serves to shift rents from buyers to sellers.   
An interesting point of departure is to consider the inter-workings of the collusive 
arrangements.  As noted earlier, I monitored the discussions between sellers and noted their 
bantering about optimal strategies.  Invariably, pricing based on unit cost dominated the 
conversation.  A first inclination for many of the sellers was to simply “double the price” from 
the marginal cost (even though sellers were prohibited from discussing costs, it was clear that 
they could intuit that others had identical cost structures from the discussions).  This propensity 
can be seen in the data summary contained in Table 4, but is even more perspicuous in the 
practice rounds, where sellers’ commitment to the “double rule” in some cases left them selling 
their goods immediately ($2 treatment) or not selling anything ($13.50 treatment).  This is 
evident in the early periods of the experiment as well, but seller learning led to comments such as 
“I think they will pay more,” or “we have to lower the price or we will sell nothing” that lead to 
the data patterns in Table 4.  Nonetheless, the data patterns are interesting in that they appear to 
approach the joint profit-maximizing strategy, especially in the $7 and $13.50 treatments. 
The next set of treatments—Framedinf, FramedNoprice, and FramedShock—draw the 
framed field treatments closer to the naturally-occurring environment.  Yet, as Table 4 makes   31
clear, none of these three treatments has a considerable influence on outcomes.  While there is 
some treatment influence in the direction that theory would predict—downward pressure on 
prices—I continue to find that the collusive arrangements are stable and that buyers pay much 
more for wares than they would under a comparable setting with no seller communication.   
The final set of treatments moves the experimental environment to perhaps an even more 
natural setting whereby dealers place the experimental good on their dealer table and 
occasionally are visited by my buying agents.  Because these data do not have the natural 
chronological ordering as the other framed field treatments, I summarize these results in Table 5.  
Table 5 presents the data by the average negotiated and final transaction price as well as the 
proportion of each that is considered cheating on the collusive agreement that the sellers have in 
place.  The negotiated seller offer data are gathered via each buyer filling in the appropriate 
portion of the survey in Appendix B upon his return from each visit to the market.  Each buyer 
filled in what the approached dealers offered—both initial and a final offer prices—before 
receiving a new induced value for the next round of visits.  I also fill in these figures for the 
treatments discussed above, but since the various framed field bilateral bargaining markets move 
quickly within any given period, the negotiated prices with each seller are not available (indeed, 
buyers do not even recall many of the offers that were made in the bargaining process).   
Table 5 provides some interesting insights.  For example, summary data in row 1, which 
includes pooled results for the various framed treatments (data from the CAsymm$7, FramedInf, 
FramedNoprice, and FramedShock), reveals the significant effects of collusion, as only 47 
percent of visits result in a purchase.  This figure is considerably less than the percent transacted 
in Treatment NCAsymm$7, which reached 100 percent in period 5 and was nearly 90 percent in 
the final three periods (see Table 3).  There is some cheating observed in these framed field   32
treatments, however, as nearly 10 percent of executed transactions were lower than the agreed 
upon collusive arrangement.  Of those cheating transactions, the price was 6.4 percent below the 
agreed upon collusive price.   
Overall, summary figures in Table 5 show that the various treatments have important 
influences on seller behavior.  Again, to explore whether the treatment effects are statistically 
significant, I begin with a conservative approach wherein each collusive group provides one 
observation, which yields some useful insights.  First, cheating rates are significantly higher in 
the FramedTable treatment compared to the framed (pooled) treatments at the p < .05 level using 
a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of treatment differences.  This result implies that simply moving 
from the five minute per period setting where 12 buyers and 4 sellers attempt to transact in every 
period to the more natural setting causes sellers to cheat on their agreements much more often.  
This change in treatment clearly makes the market more fluid, as now roughly 64 percent of 
visits result in a transaction, and the intensity of cheating increases too:  for those transactions 
that violated the explicit collusive agreement, price was nearly 13 percent below what was 
agreed upon versus 6.4% in the framed (pooled) treatments.  Both of these differences are 
statistically significant at the p < .05 level using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test. 
Second, when the number of sellers in the collusive arrangement decreases from four to 
two (FramedTable versus Framed2Sellers), cheating rates halve (declining from 33% to 16%).  
The reluctance to cheat among two seller arrangements is also found in the average negotiated 
seller quotes, whereas 18.4 percent of the FramedTable price quotes are below the agreed upon 
price, only 7.8 percent of the Framed2Sellers quotes are below the agreement.  Both of these 
differences are significant at conventional levels.  Finally, conditional on coalition size, when the 
stakes are increased cheating rates rise:  rates triple from 16 percent to 48 percent, and the   33
average cheating deviation is 16 percent below the arranged price.  This leads to a much lower 
average transacted price of $12.42.  These differences are each significantly different across 
Framed2Sellers and FramedHighStakes.  Interestingly, the FramedHighStakes price remains 
significantly above the prices realized in the latter periods of Treatment NCAsymm$7, but are 
below the average transacted prices for the other framed field experimental treatments.   
As a robustness check, I estimate an empirical model that makes the dependent variable 
either i) whether the transaction is cheating on a collusive agreement, or the i) degree of 
cheating.  Specifically, for i) I estimate Chi = β`Xi + ei, where  Chit equals unity if the ith 
transaction cheats on the collusive agreement, 0 otherwise; Xi includes the treatment effect 
dichotomous variables, the buyer and seller observables from the survey, and I account for the 
data dependencies among buyers and sellers by exploring models that include fixed effects 
(when possible) and random effects.  For ii), I estimate %Chi = β`Xi + ei, where %Chi equals the 
percentage price deviation from the agreed upon price in the ith transaction; other particulars are 
consistent with estimation of i).  Because empirical results are broadly consistent with the 
statistical findings discussed above, I make these results available upon request.   
C.  Natural Field Experimental Results 
To begin the discussion of the natural field experimental data, I present the summary 
statistics of the pooled data—455 individual negotiations—ignoring data dependencies and 
coalition particulars.  Table 6 extends Table 5 and provides summary results by the percent of 
offers that cheated—both negotiated and transacted offers—the price deviation from the agreed 
upon collusive price, the percent of induced values (visits) that resulted in transactions, and the 
percentage of surplus captured in the market.  For comparison purposes, Table 6 includes data 
across both the framed and natural field experiments.  I also provide Figure 2, which summarizes   34
the proportion of transactions that had executed prices below the agreed upon collusive price 
(i.e., the proportion of “cheating” transactions).   
  An interesting data pattern emerges:  for the natural field treatment, many more of the 
transaction prices are in violation of the collusive agreements.  For instance, in 46 percent of the 
cases, my confederate negotiated a price lower than the collusive price agreement.  Further, in 69 
percent of the actual transactions, the price was below the collusive price.  Using a conservative 
testing approach wherein each collusive group provides one observation, I find that these 
percentages are both significantly larger than each of the framed field treatments using a Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test of treatment differences.  The average price deviation is also significantly 
larger using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (except for the comparison with the 
FramedHighStakes treatment).  Likewise, the percentage of available transactions executed and 
the surplus captured in the market are also significantly larger in the natural field treatment than 
the framed field treatments (again, only marginally so versus the FramedHighStakes treatment).   
  Data from the natural field experiment are sufficiently rich to allow further empirical 
investigation.  For instance, the natural data contains groups from 2-4 per collusive arrangement, 
and some of the collusive groups are composed of blood relatives (or husband/wife) whereas 
others are arrangements amongst non-relatives.  Moreover, some seller groups contain all 
women, some are all men, and some are a mix of men and women.  Further, some of the sellers 
have multiple agreements across markets whereas others only have arrangements in one market.  
Finally, I approached sellers across days that were quite busy as well as slower days.   
  To account for these differences, I estimate an empirical model in the spirit of the models 
discussed above:  i) Chi = β`Xi + ei, where Chit equals unity if the ith transaction cheats on the 
collusive agreement, and equals zero otherwise; Xi includes buyer and seller observables from   35
the survey, coalition size, a dichotomous variable that equals one if the sellers have more than 
one collusive relationship, 0 otherwise; variables that describe the composition of the group (all 
women, all men, mix; relatives); controls for the busy market day, where market day equals one 
on busy days (measured as those days that are in at least the 67
th percentile in visitations to my 
dealer table), 0 otherwise.  I account for data dependencies among buyers and sellers by 
including buyer and seller fixed effects; I also consider models that cluster standard errors at the 
buyer and seller level and results do not change markedly.   
  Empirical results are presented in Table 7.  Several results emerge.  First, consider the 
relevant outcome relationships with coalition size.   Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 reveal that there 
is more cheating in the 4-person arrangements than in the 2-person arrangements (3 person 
arrangements show no statistically significant differences).  In terms of magnitudes, sellers in 2-
person arrangements are roughly 20% less likely to cheat than sellers in 4-person arrangements.  
Columns 3 and 4 provide complementary evidence on the nature of price deviations, suggesting 
that sellers in 2-person arrangements deviate less from the agreed upon price than sellers in 4-
person arrangements.  If one considers data at the group level, columns 5 and 6 show that the 
best offer from 2-person seller groups deviates significantly less from pricing agreements than 
the best offer from 4-person seller groups. 
Second, sellers with collusive arrangements across markets cheat much less often than 
sellers who only have one collusive arrangement.  This result can be found in columns 1 and 2, 
where the data suggest that multiple collusive arrangements has an effect of reducing the 
propensity to cheat by roughly 20%.  Interestingly, this effect is comparable to the effect of 
moving from a 4-person to a 2-person collusive groups.  Columns 3-6 show that price deviations   36
among sellers who have multiple arrangements are also less severe.  Like coalition size, having 
agreements across markets leads to less cheating on both the intensive and extensive margins. 
Third, sellers cheat more on high volume, busy days.  The estimates indicate that if the 
transaction occurs on a busy market days, sellers are approximately 25% more likely to cheat on 
their arrangements.  On the intensive margin, there is mixed evidence.  In the individual data 
sellers cheat more intensively on busy days, but the group data yield evidence that is not 
consonant with this insight.  Finally, empirical results on the social variables yield some 
interesting insights.  For example, having a life relationship with a fellow colluder is associated 
with sellers cheating less often, and less intensively.  As for gender effects, men are more likely 
to cheat on pricing arrangements than women, and all-female seller groups are the least likely to 
be associated with cheating.   
Before moving to the discussion section, an important exploration is to ensure that my 
information on collusive arrangements from my mole was indeed accurate.  In Appendix C I 
present evidence that is consonant with the hypothesis that all of the arrangements that I learned 
about were accurate. 
IV.  Discussion  
While many social scientists have experienced open air markets, and have likely been 
fascinated by the underlying market dynamics and array of goods and services haggled over, few 
have reflected deeply on the underpinnings of such markets.  In this study, I depart from a 
traditional empirical investigation by using the tools of experimental economics in open air 
markets.  The paper showcases that in building a deeper understanding of economic science, it is 
desirable to take advantage of the myriad of settings in which economic phenomena present 
themselves—from the lab to the field.  In this spirit, this study presents results from an   37
examination of behavior in several experimental treatments that bridge the lab and the field.  In 
this epilogue, I summarize the results in three subsections:  theory testing, speaking to 
policymakers, and methodological contribution.19   
A.  Theory Testing 
On many dimensions the data are consistent with one theory of another.  First, the bread 
and butter of economics—supply and demand curves—provides reasonably accurate predictions 
of price and quantity realizations and their direction.  Second, when communication is allowed 
between sellers, prices are higher than in cases when no communication is allowed.  Both of 
these results are fundamental and provide insights into whether, and under what circumstances, 
the natural allocation mechanism in open air markets can yield efficient outcomes.   
Third, when digging deeper into the findings revolving around the seller communication 
treatments, several comparative static insights obtained match theory.  For instance, evidence 
from the natural field treatment summarized in Table 7 suggests that successful price fixing 
conspiracies are more likely with small numbers of firms.  This finding is in line with insights 
gained from early structure-conduct-performance theorists (e.g., Bain, 1951) who argued that an 
increase in concentration facilitates collusion.20  The intuition is that as the number of firms 
increase the value of each firm’s share of collusive profits declines—i.e., there are more firms 
claiming stake to the monopoly profits after entry.   
As stated, my result represents an easy target for criticism since it is unknown whether 
this data pattern in the natural field experiment is due to treatment or selection—perhaps more 
                                                           
19 Some readers might find these distinctions familiar.  Alvin Roth used the first two in his 1985 lecture to the Fifth 
World Congress of the Econometric Society.   
20 This led to an extensive literature on the topic.  An important line of inquiry was Demsetz (1973, 1974), who 
critiqued this notion extensively and Schamalensee (1987), Sutton (1998) and Symeonidis (2002) who empirically 
tested various models.     38
trustworthy sellers are those who are better able to coordinate smaller collusive groups.  In this 
case, the framed field treatments provide important complementary evidence.  Given that I 
randomly place sellers into various sized groups, I am able to observe how exogenous changes in 
group size affect successful price fixing.  Comparing data across FramedTable and 
Framed2Sellers (see Table 6 and Figure 2) provides supportive evidence that agents in larger 
collusive groups are more likely to cheat on their collusive arrangements.  A corollary to this 
result is that the total market surplus foregone due to collusive arrangements is significantly 
larger when the collusive groups become smaller. 
Another comparative static that matches certain theories is the observation in the natural 
field treatment that sellers cheat less when they have arrangements across multiple markets with 
another seller (see Table 7).  Emergence of such mutual forbearance is consonant with Corwin 
Edwards’ intuition, who first raised the issue in 1955 when noting that (see Sherer, 1980, p. 340): 
When one large conglomerate enterprise competes with another, the two are likely to 
encounter each other in a considerable number of markets.  The multiplicity of their 
contacts may blunt the edge of their competition. A prospect of advantage from vigorous 
competition in one market may be weighted against the danger of retaliatory forays by 
the competitor in other markets. 
 
Edwards’ intuition is appealing as the scope of punishment deviations certainly does expand as 
the extent of multi-market contact is enhanced.  Yet, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show such 
reasoning can be faulty because a seller, realizing that punishment will accrue in every market, 
will simply decide to cheat in every market, potentially merely raising proportionally the costs 
and benefits of an optimal deviation.  Several characteristics of the market, however, serve to 
severe Bernheim and Whinston’s (1990) irrelevance result.  For the purposes herein, these 
include cases where sellers attach different weights to future outcomes across markets and sellers 
are heterogeneous, characteristics that are likely prominent in this marketplace.     39
While there had been previous empirical efforts exploring this issue, the Bernheim and 
Whinston (1990) study stimulated much activity in this area (see Korn and Baum (1999) for a 
survey).  Empirical results on the relationship between multi-market contact and competition 
have generally been mixed, this stands to reason since the endogeneity of such arrangements in 
naturally-occurring data makes it difficult to pin down this effect empirically. 
Of course, this issue plagues inference made from the natural field experimental data as 
well.  Again, however, insights gained from the framed field treatments can help since I formed 
partnerships randomly.  For example, in some cases sellers in a framed field treatment were 
paired with a seller with whom they had an outside collusive arrangement.  In other framed field 
treatment cases, some sellers who had outside collusive arrangements were paired with a seller 
whom they did not have outside collusive arrangements.   
Considering data across all of the framed field treatments, I find that sellers are less likely 
to cheat in the framed field experiments when paired with a seller with whom they have an 
outside arrangement.  Indeed, when using the framed field data to estimate a probit model I find 
that the probability of cheating is a decreasing function in the number of outside arrangements 
the seller has with their experimental partner, conditional on the total number of collusive 
arrangements.  Complementing this evidence is the finding that the number of outside 
agreements is only marginally correlated with cheating rates in the framed field treatments, 
suggesting that selection is not a major issue plaguing the natural field experimental data.   
A third comparative static insight gained from the naturally occurring data is that sellers 
cheat more on higher volume days (see Table 7).  If one considers this particular type of market 
period as part of a business cycle fluctuation, and if such demand shocks are independently and 
identically distributed, then this counter-intuitive result is consistent with Rotemberg and   40
Saloner’s (1986) model.21  Nevertheless, this result might equally suggest that sellers believe it 
less likely to get caught cheating on busy days and therefore engage in more cheating during 
busy market periods.  Comparing data from Framed2Sellers and FramedHighStakes (see Table 6 
and Figure 2) presents some, albeit imperfect, evidence that is consonant with the results from 
the natural field experimental data.22   
In sum, each of these three examples suggests that critical evaluation of the natural field 
experimental data reveals that sharp tests of the theory are not possible with those data alone.  
Further, some might argue that the framed field experimental data used in isolation might not 
present a compelling case because of the artificial imposition.  Combined, however, the various 
treatments highlight the gain in inferential power of data observed across several domains.23   
B.  Speaking to Policymakers 
For more than 100 years, economists and historians serving as expert witnesses, 
commissioners, and jurists have labored to assess the “effectiveness” of cartels (Conner, 2005).  
Throughout the years, those critical of aggressive antitrust policy have embraced the Stiglerian 
notion that cartels are fragile coalitions, fraught with cheating that will eventually produce 
outcomes that more closely mirror competitive expectations.  For example, when the OPEC 
cartel began to influence world petroleum prices in the early 1970s, several leading economists 
                                                           
21 Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) present a model whereby the demand shocks are serially correlated—
unusually high demand today induces an increased probability of unusually high demand tomorrow.  In this model, 
price wars are more likely to occur in periods of downturns, not upturns (as in the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
model) since the collusive profits increase (decrease) with a positive (negative) demand shock.   
22 Further, the laboratory data provide results consistent with Green and Porter (1984), in that in many cases “price 
wars” occurred after one player chose to undercut prices or after the 5
th period demand shock.  In the field data, it is 
difficult to parse equilibrium play in the Green and Porter (1984) model from cheating in the Stigler sense.   
23 If I examine the proportion of unique sellers that cheat in these arrangements consonant insights are obtained 
across the relevant treatments. 
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predicted its imminent demise.  Adelman (1972, p. 71) wrote that “Every cartel has in time been 
destroyed by one and then some members chiseling and cheating…” 
An excellent recent overview of cartel activities is provided by Levenstein and Suslow 
(2006).  They conclude that even though many cartels collapse within a year, the average cartel 
in their sample lasted between 3.7 and 10 years (see p. 51, Table 1).24  The effect that cartels 
have on prices is less well understood.  Conner's (2005) survey identified hundreds of published 
social-science studies of private, hard-core cartels that contained 674 observations of long-run 
overcharges.  The primary finding is that the median cartel overcharge for all types of cartels 
over all time periods is 25%: 18% for domestic cartels, 32% for international cartels, and 28% 
for all successful cartels (the overcharge rate is calculated by comparing cartel prices to a 
competitive benchmark).   
In these regards the experimental data presented herein provide some interesting 
parallels.  First, consistent with Stigler (1964), the natural field experimental data suggest that 
maintaining strict compliance to the collusive agreement is difficult to sustain in a repeated game 
with secret price cuts and demand uncertainty.  In this manner, the data are consonant with the 
notion that inherent problems associated with maintaining collusive agreements might preclude 
conspiracies from having considerable influence on prices in similar market structures.  Second, 
however, in those cases where collusion was stable (the lab and framed field treatments), much 
surplus was lost.  Sellers were able to exact large price increases through explicit collusive 
arrangements and such conspiracies frustrated market efficiency considerably.   
                                                           
24 This bimodality of cartel survivorship has been the subject of intense research and our understanding of its causes 
is just beginning to crystallize.  While cheating is certainly an important factor, Levenstein and Suslow (2006, p. 45) 
argue that “the most frequent causes of cartel failure are entry and bargaining problems.”     42
These contrasting insights from nearly identical experimental situations highlight a 
general lesson for policymakers:  transference of results across situations (or time, or different 
industries) is dangerous.  Theory teaches us that the determinants of cartel success are rich, and 
the empirical data herein highlight that sellers are quite sensitive to these factors, even ones that 
many might consider ancillary.  In this spirit, one prominent aspect of the data is that one should 
take great care when generalizing results.  Theory and comparative static empirical insights can 
inform us of general principles, such as when and where to expect collusion, and when to suspect 
that collusion is having an important influence on pricing and allocation decisions.  But, 
statements on the actual existence, or efficacy, of collusive arrangements are quite difficult to 
make without actually investigating the industry itself.  I conclude in noting that empirical work 
measuring comparative statics, such as those in this study, can provide a hint about where to look 
for fire, but cannot determine by themselves whether there is an actual fire worth extinguishing.  
C.  Methodological Content 
Beyond permitting sharper inference, an advantage of sampling various environments is 
that one can explore the generalizability of behaviors across situations, or domains.  For years 
psychologists have questioned cross-situational consistency of behavior (see, e.g., Mischel, 
1968; Ross and Nisbett, 1991), and the results have not been entirely promising.  Under the 
approach in this study, I can pursue something different: determine whether important factors of 
the experimental environment, and associated experimental procedures, systematically influence 
behavior, and how we can use insights on such factors to provide more accurate predictions.   
As a guide, I use the framework put forth by Levitt and List (2007), which highlighted 
that selection rules into the actual experiment might be important.  In this regard, comparisons of 
interest include observing behavior of (i) identical individuals in the lab and the field, (ii) agents   43
drawn from the same population engaged in lab and field experiments, where the lab selection 
rules might be different from the way in which markets select individuals, and (iii) individuals 
drawn from different populations engaged in lab and field experiments.   
In the data, I find that individuals drawn from different populations show considerable 
signs of an ability to maintain collusive ties, even in austere situations.  Yet, there are some 
behavioral disparities.  For instance, students are influenced much more by changes in 
anonymity whereas marketers are influenced to a greater extent by context.  For the case of 
agents drawn from the marketing population and placed in lab and field experimental roles, I find 
only marginal evidence that selection is important.  For example, when comparing cheating rates 
in the natural field experiment across those who agreed to participate in the lab experiments and 
those who refused, I find little evidence of significant differences.  Though I should highlight 
that this comparison is made with a sample size of 17 sellers who agreed to participate in a 
controlled lab or framed field treatment, and 5 sellers who turned down the request (5 sellers 
were never asked) but participated (unknowingly) in the natural field treatment.   
Finally, examining the behavior of the 17 individual sellers who were in experiments 
across the lab and the field provides insights into generalizability of results across domains.  
Levitt and List (2007) argue that being part of an experiment in and of itself might induce certain 
types of behaviors.  In the current case, conditional on making collusive arrangements, taking 
part in an experiment might induce sellers to more readily maintain their collusive promises.  
More broadly, the conditions set forth in an experimental situation might induce behavioral 
tendencies that are simply not observed in the field.  Using data from the 17 sellers (11 of whom 
were in a lab treatment, 3 of whom were in a lab and framed field treatment, and 3 of whom were 
in a framed field treatment), I find little correlation between cheating rates across the lab   44
treatments with no context and the other environments.  However, in a simple regression model, 
the best predictor of whether they will cheat in the natural field experiment is their measured 
cheating rate in the framed field treatments and the lab treatment with context.   
This result extends the literature in psychology that argues there is only a weak 
correlation between behaviors in different settings (even across lab settings; see, e.g., Mischel, 
1968; Ross and Nisbett, 1991, for reviews).  For instance, Hartshorne and May (1928) 
discovered that people who cheat in one situation are not the people who cheat in another.  For 
my purposes, that does not mean that there is something necessarily wrong with one of the 
context free lab treatments.  Rather, it likely means that subjects saw one situation as relevant to 
honesty and one as irrelevant.   
More broadly, the study highlights that given the nature of the economic science, there is 
much to be gained from designing experimental treatments that span the bridge between the lab 
and the naturally-occurring environment.  The laboratory provides the sterile environment where 
the restricted model from physics can be the ideal.  Alternatively, experimenting in a natural 
setting, where the looser model often employed in the biological sciences prevails, provides a 
useful parallel that strongly complements laboratory results.  Where the laboratory can provide 
crisp inference and solidify insights gained from field data, field experiments can prevent the 
laboratory from over-developing ideas and concepts that have little parallel in the field.   
Likewise, if the relationships observed in the lab manifest themselves in the field, one can be re-
assured that the lab has not advanced to the point of developing artificial situations that are too 
far removed from the field.  Two-way interactions across lab and field methodologies and 
between theory and practice permit a much deeper and broader understanding of economics.     45
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Appendix A  Experimental Instructions—Lab 
 
[..] denote changes made for context treatments. 
 
This is an experiment in economic decision making.  If you follow the instructions 
carefully and make good decisions you can earn a considerable amount of money.  You will be 
paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. 
  It is important that you do not talk, or in any way try to communicate, with other people 
during the session.  If you have a question, raise your hand and a monitor will come over to 
where you are sitting [help you] and answer your question in private. 
  The experiment will consist of at least 10 rounds.  At the beginning of the experiment 
you will be randomly matched with another person in this room [another seller in the market].  
You will be paired with this person the entire experiment.  You will not know who [which seller] 
in this room [in the market] is in your group and they will not know with whom they are paired. 
  In each round, you will have the opportunity to earn money.  At the end of the session, 
we will sum your earnings from each period and you will be paid in cash this amount privately.  
Let us get started with the actual decisions that are to be made. 
Please see the payoff table.  The choices across the columns of the table:  P1, P2, and P3 
[collusive price, undercutting price, punishment price] represent decisions of the other person 
[the other seller in this market].  Similar choices down the left side represent your own decisions.  
A given choice of the other person identifies a column in the table and your choice identifies a 
row.  The cell where the column and the row intersect reveals the payoff [profit] that you will 
receive.  This might seem confusing now, but some examples should help. 
To make sure that you understand let us proceed through a few examples.  Suppose that 
you both choose P1 [collusive price].  In this case you will each receive $1 for the period.  
Alternatively, let us say that you choose P2 [undercutting price] while the other [seller] chooses 
P1 [collusive price]:  you earn $1.25 in this period and the other person [seller] receives nothing.   
Let us try a few other choices.  If you both choose P2 [undercutting price] then you will 
each receive 50 cents.  Finally, if either of you choose P3 [punishment price], then both players 
receive nothing, regardless of the other choice. 
[In addition, we have randomly pre-selected some period(s) in which your payoff 
will be zero regardless of what decisions you and the other person make (you will 
not be told either before or after which periods these are); these will occur in 
roughly 10% of the periods.] …….[addition for demand shock treatments] 
 
Please find the decision sheet in your packet.  Your task is to record your choice of P1, 
P2, or P3 [collusive price, undercutting price, or punishment price] for period 1 under the column 
headed “your decision”.  We will then collect your sheet as well as the other person’s [seller’s], 
determine your profit, and then return the decision sheets.  You will then make a choice for the 
next period.  Starting after the 10
th period, we will roll a standard die after each period, and if a 
“one” or a “two” shows up we will terminate the experiment and pay your earnings in private.   
 
Let us now begin with 2 practice rounds.  Note that there are no other people [no buyers] 
in these experiments, just you and the other person [seller] will determine your payoff [profit]. 
 Table 1A. Profit Cells 
 
     Other  Person’s  Choices 
    
    P 1    P 2    P 3  
 
  P1   $1,  $1   $0,  $1.25  $0,  $0 
Your  
Choices  P2    $1.25, $0  $0.50, $0.50  $0, $0 
 
  P3   $0,  $0   $0,  $0   $0,  $0 
 





Table 2A.  Decision sheet 
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Appendix B.  Confidential Survey 
 
These questions will be used for statistical purposes only.  THIS INFORMATION 
WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL BE DESTROYED UPON 
COMPLETION OF THE STUDY. 
1. How long have you been active in the flea market?  _______yrs 
2. Are you a flea market dealer?________ 
2a.  How many years have you been attending markets at this site (as a dealer, if a 
dealer)?________ 
2b.  In a typical month, how often do you come to this site and/or go to other sites (as a 
dealer, if a 
dealer)?________________________________________________________________ 
3.  Gender:  1) Male      2) Female 
4.  Age   ______             
5.  Date of Birth   ____________ 
6.  Race:   White  Black  Other 
7.  What is the highest grade of education that you have completed? (Circle one)    
     1) Eighth grade   3) 2-Year College                  5) 4-Year College 
     2) High School   4) Other Post-High School    6) Graduate School Education 
Addition for lab treatments: 
Have you ever had interaction with your partner before? ________ 
Addition for buyers: 
1
st dealer: 
8.  What was the initial offer made by the dealer?_______________________ 
9.  What was the final offer made by the dealer?________________________ 
10.  Have you ever had interaction with that dealer?______________________ 
2
nd dealer: 
8a.  What was the initial offer made by the dealer?_______________________ 
9a.  What was the final offer made by the dealer?________________________ 
10a.  Have you ever had interaction with that dealer?______________________ 
3
rd dealer: 
Etc.   3 
Appendix C.  Credibility of Information from the Mole 
 
  Proper inference from the natural field experiment relies on credible information 
from the Mole.  While proving that the information is credible is akin to trying to prove 
that you do not have a sister, I proceed in three directions to address questions on the 
veracity of the Mole’s claims.  These identification strategies rely on parallel data 
gathered across markets, goods, and sellers.   
  The first approach is to observe negotiating patterns of the exact same dealers 
selling identical goods in other markets (markets geographically separated from the 
markets where the collusive arrangements exist).  In this case, I observe 8 of the 27 
dealers selling identical goods in other markets.  Using the exact same buying approach 
as in the natural field experiment, I had buying agents systematically approach these 
sellers.  I find in these cases that quotes typically start 10%-25% lower than received 
quotes from these sellers in collusive markets, and transaction prices are generally 10%+ 
lower in these markets.  These variations are much larger than any of the cross-market 
price variations observed in the natural field experiment, suggesting that there is an effect 
of collusion.  Moreover, I am not merely capturing cross-market variation with this first 
robustness test. 
  The second piece of evidence relates to keeping the seller pool and market 
constant, but changing the type of good sold.  In these cases, I observe the exact same 
sellers engaging in transactions in one of my 8 markets of interest—i.e., a marketplace 
where they are colluding over other goods.  A shortcoming is that I do not know the 
marginal costs for these goods, but I can learn something from the price variances 
because the goods in this case are substitutes for the goods in the main experimental 
examination.  Again, using the exact same buying approach as in the natural field 
experiment, I find that the price variances—both negotiated and transacted—are much 
higher than the variances observed in the market over the colluded goods.   
  The third approach entails observing sellers who are selling in these markets, but 
who are not part of the collusive ring.  I observe 7 dealers selling goods that are very 
close substitutes to the goods that the colluders are selling.25  These sellers might be 
considered the “competitive fringe,” and they sell some similar goods in 2 of the 8 
markets where I observe collusion.  Again, I am not aware of these sellers’ marginal 
costs, but I can observe their bargaining tendencies.  Using a similar buying approach as 
above, I find that in these cases the competitive fringe sellers provide quotes that are in 
the range of 10%-20% lower than received quotes from colluding sellers, and transaction 
prices are roughly 10%+ lower from these sellers.    
  While none of these approaches is air tight in isolation, the concurrence of 
evidence across the three very different approaches induced me to go forward with the 
experimental design trusting the Mole’s claims.   
                                                           
25 For the purposes herein, there are some interesting behavioral tendencies among the colluders in these 
markets that contain fringe sellers, but I will reserve that discussion for a different occasion.  These 
tendencies do not frustrate inference made in this paper, however.   4 
 
Table 1  Experimental Design 
 
Laboratory Treatments  Framed Field Treatments  Natural Field Treatment 
LabIS; n=24; Lab 
treatment with student 
subjects; standard game 
that provides individual 
cooperation rates 
 
LabIIS; n=24; Lab 
treatment with student 
subjects; adds demand 
shocks to Lab IS 
 
LabIIIS; n=24; Lab 
treatment with student 
subjects; takes away 
between subject 
anonymity from Lab IIS 
(subjects know the identity 
of their partner) 
 
LabIIISC; n=24; adds 




FramedNCSymm; 12 buyers, 
4 sellers; 2 sessions; bilateral 
trading market, no 
communication allowed 




buyers, 4 sellers total; 4 
sessions ($13.50 has 2 
sessions, the others have 1); 
identical to FramedNCSymm 
except supply is perfectly 
elastic at $2, $7, and $13.50. 
 
FramedCAsymm; 12 buyers, 
4 sellers; 6 sessions (2 
sessions each); identical to 
FramedNCAsymm except 
seller communication 
allowed; constant marginal 
cost of $2, $7, and $13.50 
 
The following build on 
FramedCAsymm MC $7 
sequentially with noted 
changes: 
Field; 82 buyers, 27 sellers; 
bilateral trading market; sellers in 
groups of 2, 3, and 4.  Composition 
of seller conspiracies is 
endogenous, whereas in Framed 
Field Treatments I composed them.  
Purchase of several goods; demand 
curve is identical to demand curve 
induced in Framed Field 
treatments   5 
LabIM; n=24; identical to 
LabIS, but with subjects 
drawn from the open air 
market 
 
LabIIM; n=24; identical 
to LabIIS, but with 
subjects drawn from the 
open air market 
 
LabIIIM; n=24; identical 
to LabIIIS, but with 
subjects drawn from the 
open air market 
 
LabIIIMC; n=24; adds 
contextual language to 
LabIIIM instructions 
 
Framedinf; 12 buyers, 4 
sellers; 1 session; infinite 
supply at marginal cost of $7 
 
FramedNoprice; 12 buyers, 4 
sellers; 1 session; identical to 
FramedCAsymm except with 
no price revelation after a deal 
is consummated 
 
FramedShock; 12 buyers, 4 
sellers; 1 session; identical to 
FramedNoprice with a 
demand shock  
 
FramedTable; 24 buyers, 16 
sellers (sellers in groups of 4); 
good placed on table and 




Framed2sellers; 54 buyers, 
28 sellers (sellers in groups of 
2); 4 pairs facing the same 
demand curve as 
FramedTable; 10 pairs facing 




buyers, 12 sellers (sellers in 
groups of 2), profits 
multiplied by 5 for sellers; 
sellers face the same per seller 




Notes:  Each entry represents a unique treatment in which I gathered data.  For example, “LabIS” in row 1, 
column 1, denotes that one treatment had 24 student sellers participate in a lab experiment.  No student or 
market subject participated in more than one lab treatment; some selling agents participated in more than 
one treatment (in most cases, unbeknownst to them).   
   6 
 
Table 2  Buyer and Seller Reservation Values (in dollars) by Market Period 
 
 Period  1 Period  2 Period  3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period  7
Buyer 1  19  14  17  13  14  19  14 
Buyer 2  18  9  10  17  11  18  9 
Buyer 3  17  10  11  16  13  17  10 
Buyer 4  16  11  12  15  9  16  11 
Buyer 5  13  12  16  14  18  13  12 
Buyer 6  14  13  14  19  15  14  13 
Buyer 7  15  16  14  12  19  15  16 
Buyer 8   12  14  15  11  16  12  14 
Buyer 9  11  15  13  10  17  11  15 
Buyer 10  10  17  18  9  14  10  17 
Buyer 11  9  18  19  14  10  9  18 
Buyer 12  14  19  9  18  12  14  19 
              
Seller 1a  8  8  8  8  8  8  8 
Seller 1b  14  14  14  14  14  14  14 
Seller 1c  18  18  18  18  18  18  18 
Seller 2a  9  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Seller 2b  13  13  13  13  13  13  13 
Seller 2c  17  17  17  17  17  17  17 
Seller 3a  10  10  10  10  10  10  10 
Seller 3b  13  13  13  13  13  13  13 
Seller 3c  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
Seller 4a  11  11  11  11  11  11  11 
Seller 4b  12  12  12  12  12  12  12 
Seller 4c  15  15  15  15  15  15  15   7 
Table 3  Laboratory Experimental Results 
 
   Price  Choice 
 
Treatment  P1 P2 P3  Average  Profit 
 Collusive  Undercutting  Punishment (per  period)  Eff. 
 
Students 
 LabIS  60.3%  35.6%  4.2%  $1.44 72.4% 
           (0.38) 
 
 LabIIS  45.3%  51.1%  3.9%  $1.31 65.6% 
           (0.42) 
 
 LabIIIS  59.8%  35.6%  4.5%  $1.44 71.7% 
           (0.40) 
 
 LabIIISC  55.3%  38.3%  6.4%  $1.32 66.0% 
        (0.44) 
Marketers 
 LabIM  46.5%  45.8%  7.6%  $1.23 61.6% 
           (0.49) 
 
  LabIIM  47.9% 40.4% 11.7%  $1.10  55.0% 
           (0.52) 
 
 LabIIIM  51.9%  41.0%  7.1%  $1.31 65.7% 
           (0.56) 
 
 LabIIIMC  61.4%  32.2%  6.8%  $1.39 69.7% 
        (0.41) 
Note:  Figures in table represent averages across the various price choices and average profit (with 
standard deviations in parentheses).  For example, in the “LabIS” treatment, 60.3% of subject choices 
were P1, or the collusive price.  And, the average period payoff was $1.44.  I also include the overall 
average efficiency for each treatment (denoted eff.), where efficiency is measured as profitsi/available 
profits, which is profits secured by pair i (averaged over all periods and pairs) in the session divided by 
profits available ($2 in all treatments).  The various treatments are defined in Table 1.   8 
Table 4  Experimental Results—Framed Field Treatments 
 
     Market  Period 
Treatment  (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NCSymm  
  Average  price  14.00 14.60 14.00 13.97 13.48 
 Std.  deviation  (1.71)  (1.50) (0.96) (0.92) (0.92) 
  Quantity  (Q=5)  (Q=5.5) (Q=5.5) (Q=7.5)  (Q=7.5) 
 
NCAsymm$2    
  Average  price  6.78 5.86 5.45 6.55 5.79 
 Std.  deviation  (2.86)  (2.36) (1.41) (2.55) (1.69) 
  Quantity  (Q=9)  (Q=11) (Q=12) (Q=11)  (Q=12) 
 
NCAsymm$7  
  Average  price  13.50 12.83 11.50 10.00  9.75 
 Std.  deviation  (1.29)  (1.32) (1.51) (0.53) (1.29) 
  Quantity  (Q=4) (Q=6) (Q=8)  (Q=11)  (Q=12) 
 
NCAsymm$13.50  
  Average  price  15.12 15.10 14.67 13.80 13.59 
 Std.  deviation  (1.89)  (2.34) (1.42) (0.25) (0.19) 
  Quantity  (Q=4) (Q=3.5) (Q=6)  (Q=7)  (Q=7) 
 
CAsymm$2  
  Average  price  5.84 5.57 6.25 7.00 7.67 
 Std.  deviation  (2.19)  (1.53) (0.85) (0.72) (1.99) 
 Quantity  (Q=9.5)  (Q=11.5)  (Q=12) (Q=12)  (Q=12) 
 
CAsymm$7 
  Average  price  16.00 15.75 15.10 14.63 14.15 
 Std.  deviation  (1.10)  (1.39) (0.57) (0.43) (0.32) 
  Quantity  (Q=3) (Q=4) (Q=5) (Q=6)  (Q=6.5) 
 
CAsymm$13.50  
  Average  price  19.00 18.00 17.00 16.50 16.44 
 Std.  deviation  (0.0)  (0.0) (1.41)  (1.41)  (0.50) 
  Quantity  (Q=0.5) (Q=2) (Q=2.5) (Q=4)  (Q=4)   9 
Table 4 continued 
 
 
     Market  Period 
Treatment  (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
FramedInf 
  Average  price  14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 
 Std.  deviation  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Quantity  (Q=5) (Q=7) (Q=7) (Q=6) (Q=7) 
 
FramedNoprice 
  Average  price  14.70 14.83 14.00 14.00 13.86 
 Std.  deviation  (0.45)  (1.33) (0.63) (0.63) (0.69) 
  Quantity  (Q=5) (Q=6) (Q=7) (Q=6) (Q=7) 
 
FramedShock    
  Average  price  15.75  15.00 0.00 14.50  13.71 
 Std.  deviation  (0.50)  (0.82) (shock) (0.54)  (0.76) 
 Quantity  (Q=4)  (Q=7)  (…)  (Q=6)  (Q=7) 
Note:  Figures in table represent averages across the sessions in each treatment.  Summary statistics are 
provided for price, its standard deviation, quantity traded, and efficiency for each period.  For 
example, in the “NCSymm” sessions, period 1 had an average trading price of $14 with a standard 
deviation of $1.71.  On average, 5 goods were purchased.  Three of the fifteen sessions proceeded to 
period 6 (but no further); these data are not significantly different than their respective period 5 
sessions so I suppress their presentation, but make these data available upon request.   10  
Table 5  Framed Field Experimental Summary of Cheating Rates 
 
 
Treatment  Seller    Percent  Percent Transacted Percent Average 
 Negotiated  Offer  Cheated  Transacted  Price  Cheated  Cheat 
 
Framed ---  ---  47%  $14.51 9.6%  6.4% 
(lab markets pooled)        (0.90)  
 
FramedTable $13.96  18.4% 64% $13.51 33%  12.8% 
   (0.97)      (1.08)   
 
Framed2Sellers $14.36  7.8%  58%  $13.99  16%  7%
   (2.14)      (1.35) 
 
FramedHighStakes $13.48  29%  69%  $12.42  48%  16% 
   (2.30)      (1.47) 
Note:  Figures in the table represent averages across the various treatments.  Framed (lab market 
pooled) pools data from the CAsymm$7, FramedInf, FramedNoprice, and FramedShock treatments.  
Framed2Sellers pools data from both 2-seller demand treatments.  “Seller Negotiated Offer” is the 
average negotiated final price quote across every dealer approached in that treatment (including the 
dealers who executed a trade).  “Percent Cheated” is the percentage of those price quotes (in the 
immediate column to the left) that were lower than the agreed upon collusive arrangement.  “Percent 
Transacted” is the percentage of visits to the market that resulted in a transaction (each unique induced 
value represents one visit to the market).  “Transacted Price” is the average price of the good across 
every actual sale in that treatment.  Of those prices that are considered cheating, “Average Cheat” is 
the percentage price deviation from the agreed upon collusive price averaged across all observations in 
each session.  Hence, the numbers can be read as follows for the FramedTable treatment: the average 
negotiated seller offer was $13.96, 18.4% of the final individual offers were cheating, 64% of the 
induced values resulted in a transaction, the average transacted price was $13.51, 33% of transactions 
were below the agreed upon collusive price, and the average transaction among those observations that 
were cheating was 12.8% below the price agreement.  The various treatments are defined in Table 1.   11  
Table 6  Framed and Natural Field Experimental Data Summary 
 
 
Treatment  Percent   Price Deviation  
  that Cheated  From Agreement  Percent   Surplus 
  Negotiated  Transacted Transactions Transacted  Captured 
 
Framed   --- 9.6%  6.4%  47% 61% 
(pooled)        
 
FramedTable  18.4%  33% 12.8% 64%  77% 
         
 
Framed2Sellers  7.8%  16% 7% 58%  72% 
         
 
FramedHighStakes  29%  48% 16% 69%  84% 
         
 
Natural Field   46%  69% 19% 81%  90% 
 
Note:  Figures in the table represent averages across the various treatments.  Framed (lab market 
pooled) pools data from the CAsymm$7, FramedInf, FramedNoprice, and FramedShock treatments.  
Framed2Sellers pools data from both demand treatments.  “Percent that Cheated” is the percentage of 
price quotes that were lower than the agreed upon collusive arrangement.  “Price Deviation from 
Agreement” is the percentage price deviation from the agreed upon collusive price averaged across all 
observations in each session.  “Percent Transacted” is the percentage of visits to the market that 
resulted in a transaction (each induced value represents one visit to the market).  “Surplus Captured” is 
the percentage of available rents captured in the market.  The various treatments are defined in Table 
1. 
 
   12  
Table 7.  Regression Results for Natural Field Experiment 
  
 Individual  Level   Group  Level 
 
     %Price  %Price   %Price  %Price 
Variable  Cheat  Cheat  Dev. Dev.    Dev. Dev. 
Collusive Pair  -0.22 -0.21  -0.024  -0.06  -0.07 -0.07 
  (0.07)  (0.09) (0.015)  (0.023) (0.03)  (0.05) 
 
Collusive 3-Some  -0.13 -0.15  -0.23 -0.05  -0.11 -0.09 
  (0.06)  (0.09) (0.014)  (0.023) (0.04)  (0.07) 
  
Multiple Agreements -0.18 -0.22  -0.06 -0.05  -0.13 -0.16 
 (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.014)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.07) 
 
High Volume Day  0.25 0.27  0.04 0.04  0.02  -0.003 
  (0.05) (0.08)  (0.012)  (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) 
 
Life Relationship  -0.26 -0.24  -0.04 -0.02  -0.05  -0.008 
  (0.06) (0.08)  (0.014)  (0.02)  (0.03) (0.05) 
      
Male  0.18 0.09  0.03 -0.02  0.002  0.07 
  (0.09) (0.10)  (0.021)  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.08) 
 
All Female  0.22 0.13  0.03 -0.03  -0.001  -0.08 
  (0.14) (0.20)  (0.03) (0.09)  (0.05) (0.09) 
 
Constant  0.48 0.55  0.09 0.13  0.27 0.24 
 (0.08)  (0.10))  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
 
Seller Effects   No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Buyer Effects  No Yes  No Yes  No No 
 
R
2  0.13 0.13  0.09 0.05  0.18 0.15 
N  455 455  455 455  164 164 
Notes: 
1.  Dependent variable is whether the individual seller cheated in columns 1 and 2 (cheat = 1 if yes); in columns 
3 and 4 the percentage price deviation from the agreed upon price is the dependent variable.  Columns 5 and 6 
contain the data aggregated at the group level, and explore the deviation of the transacted price from the agreed 
upon collusive price in percentage terms.  Collusive Pair = 1 (Collusive 3-Some) if the collusive group was 
composed of two (three) sellers, 0 otherwise, and therefore the four person collusive group represents the 
baseline.  Multiple Agreements is the indicator variable that equals 1 if the seller had pricing agreements across 
spatial markets with another seller in the group, 0 otherwise.  High Volume Day is the indicator variable for 
market volume and equals one if the experiment was executed on a day that was in at least the 67
th percentile of 
all business days I observed.  Life Relationship is the indicator variable that equals 1 if the seller was married or 
was a relative to another seller in the group, 0 otherwise.  Male = 1 if seller was male, 0 otherwise.  All Female 
= 1 if seller group was all female, 0 otherwise 




















































































































































Figure 2.  Cheating rates for executed transactions across the various treatments.  Figures provide 
the proportion of actual transactions that were at prices below the agreed upon collusive price.   